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Article
(Re)discovering Duties:
Individual Responsibilities in the Age of Rights
Fernando Berdion Del Valle and Kathryn Sikkink
“There cannot be ‘innate’ rights in any other sense than
that in which there are innate duties, of which, however,
much less has been heard.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT HAPPENED TO DUTIES?

Human rights are, simultaneously, legal, moral, and
political claims.2 Equally important, however, is the fact that
human rights are fundamentally claims about relationships.3 To
have any practical meaning, human rights must be recognized

We thank Zachary Kaufman, Gerald L. Neuman, Samuel Moyn, Antje
Vetterlein, and Christopher Roberts for their comments and suggestions on
earlier versions of this paper. Participants in workshops at the University of
Minnesota Law School on “The State of the Field: Challenges and Opportunities
in the Study of Human Rights,” and at the University of Michigan Law School
on “Human Rights: Theory and Practice,” also provided useful comments and
feedback; in particular we thank Zacharay Elkins, Barbara Frey, Stephen Meili,
Julian Ku, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Christopher McCrudden, Steven Ratner,
Christopher Roberts, Joachim Savlesberg, Rebecca Scott, Kiyoteru Tsutsui,
Jeremy Waldron, and David Weissbrodt. We also thank Daniel Severson, Becca
Donaldson, and Elizabeth Hadaway for helpful suggestions and comments.
Finally, we wish to thank Jessica Tueller, Brooke Coe, Grayson Fuller, and
Giovanna Robledo for their research assistance.
1. See THOMAS HILL GREEN & PAUL HARRIS, LECTURES ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 28 (Paul Harris &
John Morrow eds., 1986).
2. See TONY EVANS, US HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 7 (1996).
3. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1990); CHRISTOPHER N. J.
ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 122 (2015); Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism as a Path Towards a
Discursive and Open Theory of International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 663, 686–
90 (2000).
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by states, international institutions, and society generally.
Another way to express this basic fact is that all human rights
imply duties.4 For many scholars, this logical relationship is so
widely acknowledged that asserting it borders on truism.5 A
closer look reveals that although scholars often assert the
correlation of human rights and duties, or even call for increased
attention to duties to fulfill human rights, the dynamics between
contemporary human rights and “human duties” are rarely
studied in any systematic way.6 Moreover, the now-robust
historical literature that traces the sources and evolution of
human rights concepts largely avoids tracing a history of duties.7
This lack of attention is all the more remarkable if we accept the
notion that human rights—those internationally recognized
claims articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”) and later formalized through legal
instruments and institutions—are, by now, a basic feature of
international relations.8 Human rights long ago ceased to be an
idea or even set of aspirational ideas about the dignity of
persons; they now provide the vocabulary with which we debate
many questions about international law, politics, and global
justice.9 If human rights ideas have been normalized, then, how

4. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 3–5.
5. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 9 (3d ed. 2013).
6. Countless commentaries note that duties flow from human rights, but
surprisingly few examine the sources, validity, and implications of duties of
individuals under the international regime of human rights law as it exists
today. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under
Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 52 (1992); SANDRA FREDMAN,
HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 65
(2008).
7. See Samuel Moyn, Rights vs. Duties, BOSTON REV. (May 16, 2016),
https://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/samuel-moyn-rights-duties
(“Unfortunately, while there has been great interest in the history of rights, no
one has attempted to write the history of human duties . . . to the best of my
knowledge, there is not a single book on the history of duties . . . .”); Philip
Alston, Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 2043, 2043 (2013) (reviewing JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND
THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2012) and discussing the
historiography of human rights). But see JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 1, 241
(1999) (discussing the drafting history of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights); ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 41–45 (examining the dramatic
shift away from duties language evidenced in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and on the “relational” understanding of human rights).
8. DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 24–25.
9. See generally David Kennedy, The International Human Rights
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is it that a fundamental part of those rights, namely duties, have
been sidelined or even ignored?
Today, we speak in terms of “responsibility” more often than
“duty.” In addition, duty commonly denotes a binding legal
obligation, while the term responsibility is more likely to be used
in reference to social rather than legal norms.10 This distinction
has, in part, contributed to the increased attention given to
responsibility generally in global politics; the past twenty years,
in particular, have seen a particularly blossoming of
responsibilities concepts.11 Responsibility constitutes a thread
running through a number of topical public policy subjects,
including sovereignty-as-responsibility,12 corporate social
responsibility,13 and common but differentiated responsibility
within environmental policy.14 Nowhere has attention to
responsibilities been more prominent, however, than in the
realm of human rights protection. This “turn” to responsibility
is evidenced in new norms such as the Responsibility to Protect

Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002) (“There
is no question that the international human rights movement has done a great
deal of good, freeing individuals from great harm, providing an emancipatory
vocabulary and institutional machinery for people across the globe, raising the
standards by which governments judge one another, and by which they are
judged, both by their own people, and by the elites we refer to collectively as the
‘international community.’”).
10. For example, John Ruggie, who developed the Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights, made a conscious decision to refer to a state duty
to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, and a corporate
responsibility to respect human rights. JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (2013) (“My use of the
term ‘responsibility’ was intended to signal that it differs from legal duties.”).
See also Steven Ratner Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
11. See, e.g., InterAction Council, A Universal Declaration of Human
Responsibilities, Art. 18 (1998),
http://interactioncouncil.org/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities;
INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS., TAKING DUTIES SERIOUSLY: INDIVIDUAL DUTIES
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMMENTARY 1 (1999),
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/10/103_report_en.pdf;
Amitai
Etzioni,
Communitarianism Revisited, 19 J. POL. IDEOLOGY 241, 242 (2014); see also
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107
(2011).
12. See, e.g., FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY:
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 1, 4–5 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Michael Posner, Business & Human Rights: A Commentary
from the Inside, 29 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 705, 708 (2016).
14. See, e.g., LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7–9 (2006).
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(R2P),15 discussions concerning businesses’ responsibility to
respect human rights, and the emerging notion of the Right to
Environment, which this Article explores in greater depth below.
Even so, many of these efforts have sparked opposition among
traditional supporters of universal human rights.16 Do these
developments, particularly the emphasis on the role of non-state
actors and even of individuals promoting human rights,17
indicate an emerging Age of Responsibility in global politics?18
Also, how do we account for this this new scholarly and policy
interest in the responsibilities and obligations that undergird
rights?19 Finally, how can we locate these facts within the
broader development of political obligations—or what we might
simply call the history of duty?
The aim of this Article is to recover the tradition of
individual duties that is integral to the historical origins of
international human rights.20 We argue that increased attention
to duties and responsibilities in international politics can be
necessary complements to promoting human rights, particularly
economic, social, and cultural rights. Stressing duties as useful
complements to human rights can be a tool to address pressing
global public policy challenges. This strategy holds particular
promise in issue areas such as transnational environmental
protection, and especially climate change, which traditional
15. ALEX J. BELLAMY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A DEFENSE 1
(2015).
16. Amnesty Int’l & Int’l Secretariat, Muddying the Waters: The ‘Draft
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’: No Complement to Human
Rights, 1, 3 AI Index IOR 40/02/1998 (Mar. 31, 1998); Sue L.T. McGregor,
Human Responsibility Movement Initiatives: A Comparative Analysis, 7 IN
FACTIS PAX 1, 1–2 (2013).
17. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTORS 1–2 (2006).
18. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009)
(calling for a New Era of Responsibility).
19. OLUFEMI AMAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE LAW: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(2011); Samantha Besson, The Bearers of Human Rights’ Duties and
Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)evolution?, 32 SOC. POL’Y & PHIL.
244 (2015); John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(2008); Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations,
and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565 (2000); FREDMAN, supra
note 6; WALDRON, supra note 12; Kennedy, supra note 9.
20. Note that in this Article the term “duty” does not primarily refer to
binding, legal obligations. Rather, “duty” here refers to a category of concept of
obligation which includes both binding duties as well as non-binding
responsibilities. This choice reflects historical patterns of usage, in which the
term duty could convey, simultaneously, legal, political and ethical meanings.
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human rights language has struggled to address adequately.21
To address environmental crises, it is necessary not only to
emphasize a human right to a clean environment, but, more
importantly, to emphasize the duty of states, corporations, and
individuals to protect the environment.22 While much attention
has correctly focused on the need for states and corporations to
limit emissions to slow climate change, individuals need to
complement state and corporate actions by working to decrease
their own carbon footprints. Similar arguments could be made
for a range of other pressing issues in the world, including
inequality, refugee flows, and the right to education. To confront
global inequality, it is necessary to stress not only the economic
rights of individuals (e.g., to an adequate standard of living), but
also the duties of individuals (e.g., to pay taxes so that their
governments can address poverty and inequality at home and
abroad).23 To address the refugee crisis in the world, we need to
highlight not only the right to asylum, but also the duty of states
to grant asylum and complementary responsibilities of
individuals to help their communities receive refugees. To
ensure that all children receive equal access to education, we
need to stress the right to education as well as the duty of
parents, communities, and states to create the conditions under
which that right can be fulfilled. In sum, recovering and
updating historical understandings about individual duties may
provide human rights the vocabulary with which to address
some of our most pressing collective policy concerns. Duties can
play this vital role because, by definition, they identify the actors
who are needed in order to make human rights real. This aspect
of duties was recognized in 1944 when a multinational group of
jurists and legal scholars from the American Law Institute
(“A.L.I.”) argued that declarations of international rights
unaccompanied by recognition of duties would make those rights
no more than “pious aspirations.”24

21. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 106–07 (1991); Christopher Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 450, 453–55 (1972).
22. Shelton, supra note 21; Stone, supra note 21.
23. We are indebted to Samuel Moyn, supra note 7, for drawing our
attention to this duty/rights issue.
24. A.L.I., REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE AND STATEMENT OF
ESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS BY A COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS REPRESENTING THE
PRINCIPAL CULTURES OF THE WORLD 7 (Feb. 24, 1944).
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Although duty is among the oldest topics in political
thought, there is sparse scholarship focused specifically on
duties in the human rights story.25 Scholars of human rights
history have largely failed to account for the lack of explicit
mentions of responsibilities in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.26 They have also failed to reach a consensus on
why or how the emphasis on duties and responsibilities has
reemerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.27 Some chalk up
the renewed interest in the topic to the global turn to
neoliberalism in the last thirty years, as neoliberalism places a
greater burden on individuals to be self-reliant and productive
(e.g., neoliberal principles might be described in terms of duties
toward the market economy).28 Others suggest the recent call on
duties comes from the increasing global influence of
communitarian-minded societies, such as Singapore and China,
where the good of the community can take priority over the
rights of the individual.29 Intriguingly, some empirical research
in psychology has investigated cross-cultural understanding of
rights and duties, finding support for the notion that some basic
principles of rights and duties exist cross-culturally, even though
the specific scope and content of those duties vary widely across
cultures.30 But even these investigations of notions of duties as
25. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Individual’s Duties to the
Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article
29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Freedom
of the Individual under Law, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983); DENG
ET AL., supra note 12; Paust, supra note 6.
26. Johannes Morsink’s work is a notable exception. His definitive account
of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a chapter
on the debate over individual duties. However, Morsink’s text does not address
the broader question of why duties were a prominent topic of discussion to begin
with or what became of them after the passage of the UDHR. See MORSINK,
supra note 7.
27. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 6.
28. MICHAEL PETERS & JAMES MARSHALL, INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMUNITY: EDUCATION AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
63 (1996); RACHEL S. TURNER, NEO-LIBERAL IDEOLOGY: HISTORY, CONCEPTS
AND POLICIES 4–5 (2008); Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On
Market-Embedded Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2008).
29. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES: CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES
AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS IN ASIA 8 (Michael Jacobsen & Ole Bruun
eds., 2000); Neil Mitchell et al., Liberalism, Human Rights, and Human
Dignity, 81 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 921, 922 (1987); Amartya Sen, Human
Rights and “Asian” Values, NEW REPUBLIC, Jul. 14 & 21, 1997, at 33 (2008).
30. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
AND NORMATIVE COMMENTARIES (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam
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they exist in popular morality do little to clarify their role in the
international human rights regime. Despite the uptick in
attention, duties within human rights are mired in a kind of “no
man’s land.” Recognized as an important predecessor to rights,
their status today under international human rights law is left
conveniently vague. The unstated consensus appears to be that
while informal and voluntary “responsibilities” may have
important roles to play in guaranteeing rights, “duties” per se do
not. At best, duties seem to offer a benign, if slightly oldfashioned, vocabulary to discuss the personal obligations
undergirding human rights. At worst, they serve to strip rights
of their power, offering justification for authoritarian-minded
coercion, or providing a legal pretext with which to deny
individuals their universal rights.31
In contrast with this common view, our study reveals that
the attention to duties in conjunction with rights is neither a
new nor an intrinsic threat to human rights. In fact, duties and
rights concepts have been linked together since the late 18th
century, the same historical moment when phrases such as the
Rights of Man proliferated.32 This Article traces the historical
links between human rights and duties, describing their origins
in the 19th and 20th century Atlantic republican tradition, and
their growing prominence until their moment of crisis in the
mid-20th century. In 1948, during the course of a single year,
duties in human rights were inserted into the American
Declaration, included prominently in draft versions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal
eds., 2005).
31. This Article consciously employs the term “duties” rather than
“responsibilities.” We make this choice, in part, to reflect the historical record
of human rights discourse, where, until recently, “duties” played a much more
prominent role than “responsibility.” In addition, “duties” language preserves
the moral and ethical connotations that were firmly a part of human rights
discussions in the late 1940s, and which may contribute in constructive ways to
contemporary human rights discourse. Despite these subtle differences in
meaning, for the purposes of this Article, the two terms can be treated as rough
synonyms. In other words, this Article emphatically rejects the idea that the
emerging set of voluntary “responsibilities” ought to be jettisoned and replaced
with binding and legally enforceable “duties.” Rather, we suggest that “duties”
under human rights were once more flexible concepts than is usually assumed,
and that recovering this tradition of duties may complement the current push
for responsibilities under human rights. Some also now see a link between
responsibilities and notions of dignity. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 12.
32. PETER DE BOLLA, THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONCEPTS: THE HISTORICAL
FORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77–86 (2013); DOUGLAS HODGSON, INDIVIDUAL
DUTY WITHIN A HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 1–2 (2003).

196

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

Declaration” or “UDHR”), and eventually reduced to a single
vague article (XIX) in the Universal Declaration.33 After 1948,
duties followed a bifurcated path: international, legal human
rights continued to downplay or omit explicit mention of duties,
while in the sphere of regional human rights and national
constitutions, duties persisted and even proliferated.34 But, as in
Jorge Luis Borges’ Garden of Forking Paths, diverging tracks
often separate and converge again, sometimes in unexpected
ways.35 Today, duties and rights language are intersecting
again, and in doing so, they are offering a set of conceptual tools
that allow us to preserve the core ideas of human rights, while
confronting transnational policy challenges.
The argument proceeds in four parts. The first part presents
a sketch of duties within human rights in conceptual terms. In
particular, we note that the “rights and duties correlative” model
does not sufficiently illustrate the meaning of the concept as it
was first used by human rights advocates in the mid-to-late
1940s. As a result, we present a vision of human rights duties
understood as the necessary obligations of individuals which
enable contemporary human rights. Building on other
treatments of the subject, we distinguish “vertical” duties,
directed toward coercive entities (e.g., states, churches,
monarchs), from “horizontal” duties, which are held mutually by
political equals (e.g., between family members, members of a
local community, and other persons tied together by civil,
economic, and environmental association).36 Finally, we suggest
33. MORSINK, supra note 7.
34. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82,
doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17 [hereinafter American Declaration]; African [Banjul]
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986);
Allen Buchanan, Why International Legal Human Rights?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244, 244–62 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015);
Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A
Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 40 (2005)
(discussing the diffusion of international human rights norms and national
constitutional provisions). While Elkins & Simmons explore the process of
“downward” diffusion, we suggest a potential “upwards” diffusion from national
constitutions to the international human rights system.
35. JORGE LUIS BORGES, COLLECTED FICTIONS (Andrew Hurley trans.,
1998).
36. See Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism: A Defence, 5 CRITICAL REV. OF
INT’L SOC. AND POL. PHIL. 86, 91 (2002); Jonathan Seglow, Associative Duties
and Global Justice, 7 J. MORAL PHIL. 54, 54 (2010); Knox, supra note 19.
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the need for networked rights and duties, a conceptual vision in
which rights and duties do not exist in a dyad of individuals and
states, or even of individuals to other individuals, but as a
mutually reinforcing set of obligations involving a wider array of
actors. We argue that such a networked concept of duties among
multiple duty holders is exactly the kind of understanding
necessary to help us address some of the pressing policy issues
of the 21st century, such as climate change and corporate social
responsibility.
The second part turns to the historical origins of duties
within human rights. This section traces how a liberal duties
tradition gained steam slowly over the course of the long 19th
century, eventually playing a major part in the debates leading
up to the drafting of the UDHR in 1948. We stress that the
linking of rights and duties is a deeply-rooted principle in the
history of human rights—a history that cuts across the
traditional boundaries of liberalism, conservatism, and
communitarianism. In the process, we document the marked
shift in the vocabulary of international human rights from ideas
framed largely in terms of state and individual duties to freestanding concepts grounded in beliefs about inherent human
dignity.37 Using new archival sources, we highlight how norm
entrepreneurs from the Global South, especially juristdiplomats from Latin American states, contributed to the
coupling of rights and duties within a legal, human rights
framework.38 These findings further reinforce earlier research,
showing that universal human rights, sometimes thought to be
fundamentally Western, were actually informed by a much
broader variety of political traditions and philosophies,
including some from the Global South.39 These traditions lent
37. JOSEPH R. SLAUGHTER, HUMAN RIGHTS, INC.: THE WORLD NOVEL,
NARRATIVE FORM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2007); A.L.I., supra note 24.
38. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Latin America and the Idea of the
International Protection of Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LATIN
AMERICA IN THE WORLD 349, 349 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Ana Covarrabuias eds.,
2015) (“Few histories stress that Latin American states passes a similar
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man a full eight months
before passage of the UDHR. The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of
Man was in fact the ‘first broadly detailed enumeration of rights to be adopted
by an intergovernmental organization.’”).
39. See generally Paolo Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions:
Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUM.
RTS. Q. 281 (2003) (describing the contribution of Latin American countries to
the genesis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Mary Ann Glendon,
The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human
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support to universal human rights while stressing the inherent
social dimension of individuals; more specifically, we find that
these Latin American norm entrepreneurs did not innovate so
much as incorporate ideas from a bundle of related political
traditions available to them.40 Most notably, we look to Atlantic
republicanism,41 Catholic Social thought, 42 and Latin American
liberalism.43
The efforts of these legal norm entrepreneurs44 resulted in
one of the first inter-governmental human rights agreements:
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(“American Declaration”).45 Despite this brief moment of
ascendency for human duties, these core concepts failed to be
incorporated into subsequent international legal human rights
agreements (with the exception of the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights, which revived the rights and duties
model of the American Declaration).46 Given this historical
trajectory, we approach a historical puzzle: why did
responsibilities, obligations, and duties of individuals fail to
Rights Idea, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27, 27 (2003) (characterizing the Latin
American contribution to the development of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as “the forgotten crucible of the universal human rights idea”);
Kathryn Sikkink, Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea
of International Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL GOVOVERNANCE 389 (2014)
(describing generally Latin American human rights protagonism).
40. See Sikkink, supra note 39, at 390; see generally Sikkink, supra note 38
(describing the history and contributions of the Latin American human rights
movement).
41. See, e.g., ERIK J. OLSEN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES OF
DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY OF POST-SOCIALIST POLITICAL THEORY (2006); J. G.
A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (2003).
42. See, e.g., Pope Leo XII, Rerum Novarum – Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo
XIII on the Conditions of Labor (May 15, 1891), in 2 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS
1878–1903, 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981).
43. See, e.g., JAIME E. RODRÍGUEZ O., “WE ARE NOW THE TRUE
SPANIARDS”: SOVEREIGNTY, REVOLUTION, INDEPENDENCE, AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF MEXICO 98 (2012) (describing the
“determination of the people of the New World to govern themselves and to
remain free from French domination”); Karen Racine, This England and This
Now: British Cultural and Intellectual Influence in the Spanish American
Independence Era, 90 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 424, 430 n.11 (2010).
44. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L. ORG. 887, 893–95 (1998) (calling
attention to the evolution and influence of norms from the domestic context to
an international stage); ROBERTS, supra note 3, 1–18 (describing the historical
origin and trajectory of human rights).
45. American Declaration, supra note 34.
46. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 34.
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become institutionalized in the modern human rights regime, as
later international human rights instruments marginalized the
concept, often condensing responsibilities and duties into a
single, general article or a vague statement in a preamble?47
The third part of this Article investigates the legacy of the
“rights and duties” tradition in subsequent international
thought by means of new empirical data. Using a contemporary
survey of all the constitutions of the world,48 we show that where
international agreements have failed to embrace duties
language, national constitutions have stepped in, making duties,
especially individual duties, a regular feature of national
charters.49 One of the most surprising findings of this survey is
just how pervasive duties language is: a majority (60%) of the
world’s written constitutions contain at least one duty provision
which applies to individuals.50 While some of these provisions,
such as the duty to obey the constitution, are vertical and
reinforce the power of the state, a surprising number are more
accurately characterized as horizontal or even networked duties
which seek to promote links between actors at various levels of
society which, together, may help promote rights.51
47. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 29, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
48. We conducted our own independent research, with the data and tools
provided by the Comparative Constitutional Project (“CCP”), led by Zach
Elkins. The CCP compiled English language versions of all the worlds’
constitutions, and subjected them to search and tagging tools for allow for
comparative analysis. We created our own tagging system so we could locate,
analyze, and compare individual duties across the world. To view CCP’s
complete data set, see COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT,
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
For additional explanation on our use of the CCP, see discussion infra Part IV.
49. See, e.g., Willem van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and
Human Rights, About Direct Obligations And the Attribution of Unlawful
Conduct, in CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING
BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTY-BEARER REGIME 44, 58 (Wouter
Vandenhole ed., 2015) (“Some IFI member States have already adopted national
human rights legislation imposing certain duties on the Executive Directors
representing them.”); Ashfaq Khalfan & Ian Seiderman, Extraterritorial
Human Rights Obligation: Wider Implications of the Maastricht Principles and
the Continuing Accountability Challenge, in CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTYBEARER REGIME 15, 15 (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015) (discussing the
Maastricht Principles, which “define obligations and responsibilities for the
realization of human rights . . . “).
50. Data available at COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra note
48.
51. We draw on the idea of vertical and horizontal duties from Professor
John Knox. See Knox, supra note 19 (2008).
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The final section concludes by suggesting that human duties
can offer conceptual tools to reinforce the legitimacy of human
rights while also addressing contemporary, transnational public
policy challenges. We illustrate our argument in particular with
references to the idea of a duty or responsibility to protect the
environment that, interestingly, is the third most frequently
mentioned duty in written constitutions today.52 More
significantly, the duty to the environment illustrates the
relevancy of individual duties for transnational public policy
problems, namely, global climate change as well as the necessity
of duties of individuals in promoting emerging rights, such as
the Right to a Sustainable Environment.53
Through this illustrative example, we observe that duties of
individuals do not serve exclusively as a balance to rights; in
some cases, the failure to acknowledge individual duties and
responsibilities may make it impossible to enjoy a collective
right.54 Moreover, we argue that it is useful to reexamine the
rights and duties models outlined in regional human rights
agreements, especially the American Declaration and the
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (“African
Charter”). These texts highlight the relational quality of rights
and which already figure prominently in the rise of the Right to
the Environment.55 These almost-forgotten histories of human
rights and duties from the periphery can provide a bridge to
modern debates over rights, duties, and responsibilities, thereby
leading to the adaptation of human rights discourses in a more
plural and multipolar world where emerging powers—such as
Brazil, India, China, Russia, and South Africa—will increasingly
help determine the outcome of international human rights
debates.56 Attention to duties is also useful for efforts to gain
52. The duty or responsibility to protect is present in nearly 33% of national
charters, making it more popular than the much-older duty to care for, raise,
and educate children (27%). See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra
note 48.
53. See generally Shelton, supra note 21 (discussing the link between
obligations, duties, human rights, and environmental protection).
54. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTORS 74–75 (2006).
55. See generally DONALD K. ANTON AND DINAH L. SHELTON,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 118–50 (2011) (describing
the relationship between international human rights law and international
environmental law).
56. See generally Koen De Feyter, The Common Interest in International
Law: Implications for Human Rights, in VANDENHOLE, supra note 49, 158–87
(describing the development of a “global common interest” and the development
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broader support for the human rights agenda, particularly at a
time in which the legitimacy of universal rights norms is under
siege.57 Critiques of the contemporary human rights movement
come in many types, but many modern criticisms argue that
human rights ideals and institutions, while aspiring to
universality and ethical cosmopolitanism, in reality embody the
ideologies and interests of dominant Western powers.58 The
potential usefulness of duties extends to societies that have
traditionally privileged individualized negative rights against
the state over obligations to society. In the United States, for
example, much is made of the right to bear arms, but much less
attention is devoted to the duties of the owners of guns to help
diminish violence and misuse of weapons.59 With regard to
discrimination, we need to emphasize both that individuals have
a right not to be discriminated against and duties not to
discriminate.
We note at the outset that this line of argument carries risk.
Historically, many advocates of rights have feared that too much
emphasis on duties could undermine rights protections, and
these concerns continue to be present in today’s debates.60 We
need to be careful that emphasis on a duty not to discriminate
does not undermine the right to free speech, for example. It is
also true that many regimes with troubled records of supporting
human rights include a particular emphasis on duties of
of human rights law).
57. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Dec.
4, 2014, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-caseagainst-human-rights.
58. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16
(2013) (“The world in which [human rights’] claim to moral authority carries
the day is vanishing fast.”); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS
IN HISTORY 10 (2010) (“Human rights were born as the last utopia—but one day
another may appear.”); see also Kennedy, supra note 9.
59. See Christopher N. J. Roberts, Standing Our Legal Ground: Reclaiming
the Duties Within Second Amendment Rights Cases, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 235, 256–
57 (2015) (quoting Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee
Malcolm as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10–11, District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)) (“It seems, indeed, to be considered,
by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only as a right, but as a duty; for all
the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at
all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution of
the laws and the preservation of public peace.”).
60. See, e.g., Hugh Breakey, Positive Duties and Human Rights:
Challenges, Opportunities and Conceptual Necessities, 63 POL. STUD. 1198
(2015) (“[A]ny attempt to construct rights-based positive duties threatens to
dissolve hallmark features of rights.”). We also thank Christopher McCrudden
and Steven Ratner for drawing some of these risks to our attention.
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individuals in their national constitutions, often seeking to
balance the rights of individuals with the necessities of the state
or of the community as mediated through the state.61 Even so, in
the current context of strong rights protections and pressing
global problems such as climate change, the risks of inaction or
complacency are often more pressing than the risk of tipping the
balance such that individual duties outweigh individual rights.
Duties can offer a complementary vocabulary that helps
reinforce the legitimacy and universality of human rights norms.
With this purpose in mind, this Article makes a number of
original contributions. To our knowledge, it represents the first
systematic counting and categorization of duties in global
constitutions, and it is the first scholarly work to examine the
sources and development of the duties provisions within the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
Similarly, it is the first survey of the duties provisions in
domestic law since the United Nations special rapporteur
conducted an analysis of the topic in in the 1980s.62
II. BEYOND CORRELATIVITY: NETWORKED RIGHTS
AND DUTIES
How should we conceive of duties? Surprisingly, no
commonly-accepted set of categories exist in the field of
international, legal, human rights, even though an entire branch
of moral and ethical theory—deontology—is quite literally the
study of duties.63 In De Officis, Marcus Tullius Cicero famously
stressed the claims of society on the individual, “We are not born
for ourselves alone . . . but our country claims for itself one part
of our birth, and our friends another,”64 and defined virtue as
fulfillment of our roles, or personae.65 Though Cicero allowed for
the apparent conflict between the obligations arising from our
61. Some examples include Venezuela (13 individual duties), Bhutan (10
duties), Sudan (10 duties), Zimbabwe (5 duties), and Russia (5 duties).
62. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Comm’n
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Individual’s
Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms
Under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN/4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.82.XIV.1 (1983).
63. “Deontological” derives from the Greek word for “duty” (δέον), and is
defined as “the theory or study of moral obligation.” Deontology, MERRIAMWEBSTER (2016).
64. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON DUTIES 9–10, ¶ 22 (1991).
65. Id. at 42, ¶ 107.
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various roles, he ultimately argued for a synthetic approach,
believing that duties, properly understood, did not conflict with
one another.66 Building on Cicero’s insights, the early modern
legal theorist Samuel Pufendorf would be the first thinker to
categorize duties in the Natural Law and arrange them in a
systematic way. Remarkably, Pufendorf in 1691 established a
framework that is still useful in thinking about moral duties
today, including duties to the self, and to other humans.67 Yet,
despite Pufendorf’s achievements in the development of a
socially-grounded typology of duties, the arrival of Kantian
philosophy, especially his treatment of duty as a categorical
imperative grounded on reason itself, overshadowed and then
eclipsed the work done by earlier Natural Law philosophers,
much of which had been drawn from empirical observation of
existing norms, rather than from abstract reason alone.68 While
duties in the Kantian tradition would, of course, play a central
role in human rights debates, the rise of the Kantian approach
would mean a certain conceptual indeterminacy would surround
proposed obligations under international law.
The lack of accepted categories of duties is evidenced in the
way in which the documents have appeared in human rights
instruments even today. Lists of duties that appear in political
documents like constitutions or human rights declarations do
not attempt to neatly distinguish between duty types, often
mixing different kinds of duties together almost haphazardly. A
duty to obey the law, which might echo the language of Socrates
in the Crito, may exist side by side in a national charter with a
practical requirement to pay taxes in proportion with one’s
income, which, in turn, may exist alongside a romantic
exhortation that citizens must love the nation or the patria.69 In
light of this diversity of usage, we do not attempt to create a
comprehensive and systematic typology. Nor do we
66. Id.
67. Pufendorf further drew contrasts between absolute and conditional
obligations, between duties of action versus those of restraint, those engendered
through contract and those arising out of our sociable nature as well as our
obligation to preserve civil society generally. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF,
PUFENDORF: ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW
(James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991).
68. See Michael Rohlf, Immanuel Kant § 5.4, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#CatImp (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
69. For one of the earliest examples of such an amalgamation, see The
Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy (a/k/a Cádiz Constitution), 1812
CONST. (Spain).
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systematically catalogue theories of political and moral duty,
historically or within contemporary human rights thought.
Instead, we outline a general set of meanings as a basis for our
main project: to understand when and how duties were invoked,
challenged, and eventually sidestepped in international legal
human rights, while simultaneously surviving at a regional and
national level.
A duty is “a term loosely applied to any action or course of
action which is regarded as morally or legally incumbent, apart
from personal likes and dislikes.”70 A legal duty can be
understood as “a legal obligation that is owed or due to another
and that must be satisfied.”71 In domestic contract or tort law, a
breach of this legal obligation results in liability; proving that a
duty exists and then showing that it was breached “are required
elements of any lawsuit for damages.”72 Legal advocates and
scholars, even those working within the traditions of AngloAmerican positivism, have long understood that the existence of
a right implies a duty to respect that right.73 Because of this
necessary, logical relationship between rights and duties, some
legal theorists, such as Christopher Roberts, have argued that
rights should be viewed as not essentially about individuals, but
about relationships between a rights-bearer and a duty-bearer.74
This Article takes seriously Roberts’ and others’ relational
understanding of rights and duties and seeks to understand its
use in the politics of global human rights.75
Duty bearers can include states, non-state actors such as
corporations or international organizations, and individuals.76
70. DAES, supra note 62, at 38.
71. Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72. Legal Duty, THE PEOPLE’S LAW DICTIONARY (2002).
73. See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV.
175, 179 n.7 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 3, 3–4 (1993) (describing natural duties in terms of moral relation
to the law, wherein duty, or compliance with the law, is predicated on receipt of
benefits in return); see generally Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3
AM. PHIL. Q. 137 (1966) (describing the ways in which duties may be thought to
correlate with rights).
74. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 21.
75. See id.; Besson, supra note 19. The relational view is not the only
stance, however. For other perceptions of rights beyond the relational view, see
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing that rights are “primary
social goods”) and RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978)
(arguing for “rights as trumps”).
76. See, e.g., Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (delineating
alternate forms of duty, including contractual duty, duty to act, duty to defend,
etc.) In international law we often refer to the responsibility to protect, which
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Most often in the human rights context, the state is portrayed as
the primary and often exclusive duty holder.77 A right to free
expression, therefore, implies a state duty to refrain from undue
censorship, and to create the conditions under which people may
express themselves freely.78 This logic applies even more directly
in the case of a positive right, such as the right to education. In
order for this right to be realized in practical terms, the state
must take steps to make education possible, usually by
establishing schools and mandating schooling for all children
and adolescents. The human rights regime largely relies on this
state-centered model of individual rights.79
While the duties/rights relationships between the individual
and the state dyad is essential, it does not cover a range of
supplemental relationships in which individuals are both the
rights-bearers and the duty-holders; that is, where a
duties/rights relationship exists among individuals. Below we
sketch out a pragmatic approach to duties—one of which opens
the possibility of enumerated duties of individual citizens as a
complement to and as a means of realizing rights—a networked
model of duties. This approach rests largely on distinguishing
between the types of duty-holders (states or individuals) and the
types of relationships between rights-holders and duty-holders
(vertical or horizontal) while also recognizing that some rights
require multiple, overlapping layers of duty relationships to
exist at once in order for the right to become realized.
Duties in the relational sense fall into two overarching
types: vertical and horizontal. Vertical duties include those of
individuals toward the state, such as the duty to obey the laws,
the duty to serve in the military, or the duty to defend the state
in case of a national emergency. Horizontal duties are
obligations held by individuals towards other members of one’s
family, community, or society.80 These would include, for
example, duties of parents to care for and educate their children
or the responsibilities to respect the rights of others.81
primarily falls on the state. See The Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (last visited
Oct. 31, 2016).
77. DAES, supra note 62, at 39–40, ¶ 103.
78. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19:
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
79. DAES, supra note 62, at 39–40, ¶ 103.
80. See Knox, supra note 19; see also Waldron, supra note 12.
81. See, e.g., American Declaration, supra note 34, art. XXIX, XXX; African
[Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights , supra note 34, art. 27–29.
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In addition to these horizontal and vertical obligations,
constitutions and human rights documents refer to duties in
which the rights-holder and the duty-holder are one and the
same. For example, the American Declaration includes the duty
to acquire education at least at the primary level.82 Here there
is neither a vertical nor a horizontal relationship, but an
inherent or internal one—a duty to self—where the individual
possessing the right to education also has a duty to acquire that
education.83 The same is the case with the duty to vote, which
appears in some constitutions as well as in the American
Declaration; the same individual who has the right to vote has
the duty to exercise that right.84 The individual’s ability to carry
out the duty depends on the primary duty of the state to hold
elections and to facilitate voting, but there is nevertheless a
supplementary duty of the individual to vote.
This understanding of duties demonstrates that the
relationship between rights and duties is not necessarily always
a dyad between the state and the individual, but involves
supplementary and complementary relationships among
multiple actors. While a dyad model focused on the individual
and the state evokes ideas of a link or a tether between two
entities, the rights and duties model is more accurately
represented by a network of diverse actors with mutually
coexisting and potentially complementary ties.85 In the case of
the duty or responsibility to protect the environment, this
network of duty-holders is particularly important. In order for
the state to meet its responsibility to protect the environment, it
is essential that corporations and individuals fulfill their
complementary or supplementary responsibilities. If individuals
do not work to reduce their own carbon footprint, for instance, it
will be very difficult for the United States to meet its emission
goals. Simultaneously, the state needs to do more to create the
right incentives for individuals and corporations to make
responsible choices, including increasing gasoline taxes and
vehicle emission standards, and corporations and individuals
82. American Declaration, supra note 34, art. XXXI.
83. What we call an “inherent” or “internal” relationship between rights
and duties is similar to what Jeremy Waldron has referred to as “rights as
responsibilities” or “responsibility-rights. Waldron, supra, note 12. We prefer to
think of them as still two separate issues, one about rights and one about
responsibilities because an individual still holds these rights even if he or she
does not engage in the responsibility to exercise them.
84. Id. art. XXXII.
85. DE BOLLA, supra note 32, 74 & n.67.
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must exercise their supplementary responsibilities and duties.
These various types of relationships among rights-holders and
duty-bearers are illustrated below.

Types of Rights/Duties or Rights/Responsibilities
Relationships:86
Rights and Duties
Relationships:

Embedded

in

Vertical

State

Individual

Rights and Duties
Relationships:

Embedded

in

Horizontal

Individual

Individual

Individual

Society

86. All examples of duties are taken from the American Declaration, supra
note 34, and the African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra
note 34.
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Duties to Self:

Individual

Networked Rights and Duties:

State duty
Individual
duty

Corporate
responsibility

Networked
Right

In the contemporary understanding of human rights, duties
are both under- and over-accepted. It is taken for granted in
much of day-to-day life, particularly when we enter into
contracts. When we create a social media account, we commonly
agree to a statement of rights and responsibilities which places
binding obligations on us in exchange for that particular
software or technological platform, and when we sign a lease for
an apartment, we frequently agree to an enumerated list of
rights and obligations as tenants. Yet, despite our acceptance of
the rights and duties model generally, Anglo-American liberal
tradition has been remarkably reticent to incorporate a similar
idea into our understanding of political rights. The English Bill
of Rights established this tradition with its focus on rights and
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liberties, while the American Bill of Rights reaffirmed it with its
unequivocal focus on individual rights against the state.87
Rights, in this tradition are thought to exist either on their own,
or as properties of particular legal actors.
The United States, despite its debts to civic republicanism,
has never included a duty to vote; instead it appears that
individuals have a right to vote and a right not to vote.88 Nor is
there a movement underway to amend our constitution to
include a duty to protect the environment. Many other countries
in the world have been more open to the idea of individual duties,
including a duty to protect the environment.89 Today, over 60%
of all national constitutions feature at least one duty or
responsibility of the individual.90 It is particularly important to
clarify that the divisions we find on duties in constitutions are
not between the Global North and the Global South, or between
“the West and the rest.” As our empirical studies show, the
pattern of adoption across national constitutions has been more
nuanced than this. The strongest attention to duties has been in
Latin America, while the weakest is in the much smaller group
of countries that were former British colonies.91 African nations
have been avid adopters of individual duties, although not
uniformly so.92 In Asia, only some nations, such as Bhutan, have
a robust system of duties.93 Constitutions that include a duty to
protect the environment are equally well-distributed around the
world.94

87. The Bill of Rights of 1689: An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of
the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown, Parliamentary Archives,
HL/PO/PU/1/1688/1W&Ms2n2 (Dec. 1689).
88. Gordon Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution,
66 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 13, 23 (1990).
89. See BINOD PRASAD SHARMA, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION: A STUDY 3–7 (Sept. 2010), https://cmsdata.
iucn.org/downloads/constitutional_provisions_related_to_environment_conserv
ation___final.pdf.
90. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. 2008 CONST. art. 5 ¶ 1, art. 8 ¶¶ 2, 9–11 (Bhu.).
93. Compare 1995 CONST. art. XXIX (Ghana), with 2010 CONST. (Malawi).
94. See SHARMA, supra note 89, at 3–7.
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III.

1948: DUTIES IN CRISIS

A. ORIGINS: 1795 - 1917
The first modern constitution connecting rights and duties
of individuals arrived with France’s Constitution of the Year III
(1795).95 The Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and
Citizen in this constitution included many of the rights from the
original Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen from 1789, but
it also included nine articles listing duties of individuals,
containing, most importantly, the duty to respect the laws,
mentioned four times in the nine articles. The list also
establishes horizontal duties such as being a “good son, good
father, good brother, good friend, and good husband.”96 Historian
Andrew Jainchill, author of the most recent scholarship on the
Constitution of the Year III, rejects the long-held notion that the
constitution was a Catholic or conservative reactionary
document against the excesses of the Jacobin Terror, which is
also known as the Thermidorian reaction.97 Jainchill shows,
instead, that by 1795, the Thermidorian reaction98 had run out
of steam; the authors of the Constitution of the Year III were
Republicans who wanted to reclaim the revolution from its most
extreme and violent elements and reestablish order. They wrote
a constitution that featured the ideas of civic Republicanism
emphasizing civic virtue for public officials in particular.99 This
constitution featured duties language as a bulwark against
public corruption, rather than as a precondition for the exercise
of rights, or as a well-developed outline of political obligation
under the new regime.
Interestingly, even this initial foray into duties languages
engendered discussion on a topic which would haunt duties for
decades to come: the workability of enumerated duties as a
technical matter of law. In 1799, Pierre-Claude Laroche, a
Parisian legal scholar and public notary, explored the

95. 1795 CONST. (Fr.).
96. Id.
97. See ANDREW JAINCHILL, REIMAGINING POLITICS AFTER THE TERROR:
THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF FRENCH LIBERALISM 26–27 (2008).
98. Id. at 27. The Thermidorian Reaction, named after the revolutionary
calendar month of Thermidor in which it occurred, displaced Robespierre and
the Committee of Public Safety from power, thus ending the period of civil
violence known as “the Terror.”
99. JAINCHILL, supra note 97, at 31.
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relationship between rights and duties in the short-lived French
charter, offering his interpretation on the legal implications of
explicitly enumerated obligations.100 Laroche makes clear in his
gloss that duties in the Constitution of the Year II did not spark
controversy because of questions of the appropriateness of duties
per se.101 In fact, Laroche viewed duties as prior to rights, and as
the necessary condition arising out of the natural sociability of
man first described by Aristotle.102 Instead, Laroche’s
commentary displayed the concerns with the lack of analytical
rigor in the declaration of rights and duties.103 Why, Laroche
wondered, do we need to “declare” rights and duties rather than
derive them naturally from principles of human nature? Why,
also, did the French charter employ both “duties” (devoir) and
“obligation” (obligation) when the former would imply the latter?
Why were civil duties yoked to moral platitudes about the
Golden Rule and the virtues of filial piety? In raising these
various critiques, Laroche pinpointed one of the primary
weaknesses of duties discourse, namely, its lack of widely
accepted philosophical foundations and analytical boundaries.104
This indeterminacy meant that duties declarations, such as in
the Constitution of the Year III, risked devolving into a kind of
litany of moral banalities which detract from the conceptual
clarity of the rights they accompanied.
The similarly short-lived Spanish Constitution of 1812 (also
known as the Cádiz Constitution) was the first constitution in
the Hispanic world to feature duties alongside rights.105 The
constitution was also remarkable because Creole delegates from
colonial Latin America participated on equal footing with their
Spanish counterparts in the drafting process, resulting in a
charter which allowed for surprising autonomy among Spain’s
Latin American colonies.106 The document seeks to balance
newly established individual rights with traditional deference to
society and the state and the nation of Spaniards.107 Although
short-lived as a working political charter, the Constitution of
100. See PIERRE-CLAUDE LAROCHE, OBSERVATIONS SUR LA
DES DROITS ET DEVOIRS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN (1799).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

DECLARATION

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
M. C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: THE CONSTITUTION OF
CÁDIZ AND ITS LEGACY IN SPANISH AMERICA 2 (2015).
106. See RODRÍGUEZ O., supra note 43.
107. See MIROW, supra note 105, at 32.
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1812 proved to be a foundational text in Ibero-American
liberalism, and influenced generations of Latin America’s
national constitutions.108 Thus, when Latin American countries
later secured their independence from Spain in the early 1800s,
they were able to draw from the Cádiz Charter for their new
constitutions, combining protection of rights with individual
duties to state, society, and the family.109
In the Americas, duties re-emerged most prominently in the
Mexican Constitution of 1917.110 Some of these are individual
vertical duties of Mexican citizens to receive military training,
but the constitution also included horizontal duties, such as, for
example, the duty to educate one’s children. The Mexican
Constitution of 1917 was the forerunner of all the following
Latin American constitutions of the twentieth century.111
Although much work on the Mexican Constitution stresses its
emphasis on workers’ rights and the expropriation and
redistribution of land, it is equally notable for its attention to the
civil and political rights and duties of the individual, motivated
in large part by a humanist concern for the condition of the
common people and informed again by Catholic social doctrine,
despite the anti-clerical nature of the revolution.112 The Mexican
Constitution highlights the right to education in its long and
detailed third article.113 In Article 31 detailing “the obligations
of Mexicans,” the first obligation requires parents to send
children to school.114 Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution also
includes the right to health, and adds that it is a duty of parents
to preserve the mental and physical health of their children.115
The detailed section on labor laws and social security spells out
the responsibilities that employers have to provide a series of
health benefits, including special maternity benefits.116 Here, we
find a very early statement of the responsibility of businesses to
respect rights.117 Following Mexico’s example, most countries in
108. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 44 (1975).
109. Carozza, supra note 39, at 282.
110. Id. at 304.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 308.
113. Constitución Poltica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, [CP], art. 3,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] May 2, 1917 (Mex.).
114. Id. art. 31.
115. Id. art. 4.
116. Id. art. 123.
117. Id.
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the region began to include lists of rights and duties in their
respective constitutions, a trend that continues to this day.118
Moreover, as we shall see below, the duties in the Mexican
Constitution influenced in turn the duties section of American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
B. DUTIES IN 20TH CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS
The earliest proposals for international human rights
documents placed as much emphasis on spelling out duties as
they did on spelling out rights. They relied upon the state duty
model that represented the primary frame through which
European jurists viewed the concept of individual rights since
the Enlightenment.119 This was particularly true in the
codification of Inter-American norms of international law. In
1929, the American Institute of International Law, a group of
legal scholars and diplomats with members from the United
States and Latin America, published one of the first-ever
universal rights documents: the “Declaration of the
International Rights of Man,” inspired by the work of pioneering
Russian jurist and diplomat André Mandelstam.120 The first
three articles of this declaration specified the duties of states to
protect their citizens’ rights of life, liberty, property, religious
freedom, and language.121 Even though the American Institute
of International Law made bold claims about universal rights in
the 1929 Declaration, its formulation of state duties followed
earlier models, most notably the American Institute of
International Law’s “Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Nations,” published in 1916.122 The A.L.I. clarified that they

118. Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism: Social Rights
and the “Engine Room” of the Constitution, 4 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.
9, 12–13 (2014).
119. See Christian Starck, State Duties of Protection and Fundamental
Rights, 3 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 1, 1–2 (2000).
120. Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the
Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 447, 452 (1992).
121. Id.
122. See Elihu Root, President, Am. Soc’y Int’l Law, Opening Address at its
Tenth Annual Meeting in Washington (Apr. 27, 1916), in 10 AM. J. INT’L L. 211,
212–13 (1916) (containing the text of and discussing the American Institute of
International Law’s Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations).
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believed rights were “pious aspirations” unless accompanied by
clear statements of state duties.123
In 1944, on the eve of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement and
the genesis of the United Nations system, the A.L.I. gathered to
identify a common standard of “essential human rights.”124
Originally conceived as a kind of multi-cultural audit of already
existing basic rights, it eventually grew in scope and served as a
key model for the drafters of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.125 Their final product, “Report to the Council of
the Institute and Statement of Essential Human Rights by a
Committee of Advisers, Representing the Principle Cultures of
the World,” frames each individual right in terms of not only the
individual rights-bearer’s substantive liberty or entitlement, but
also the state’s duty to protect that right.126 In the Report to
Accompany the Definitive Draft Declaration of the International
Rights and Duties of Man, the first article provides: “Each State
has a duty to recognize the equal rights of every individual to
life, liberty, and property and to accord to all within its territory
to the full and entire protection of this right without distinction
as to nationality, sex, race, language or religion.”127 The
inclusion of the explicit language about the duties of states,
along with a justification for them, tends to undercut the
argument that duties have traditionally been conceived of as the
“the shadows” cast by human rights—concepts that exist, to be
sure, but only insofar as they mirror the more robust and
meaningful rights of individuals. Nevertheless, the document
makes it clear that talks of universal rights defaulted to a
discussion of state responsibility.
The A.L.I. recognized that the precision with which state
duties are enumerated is itself a highly contested political issue.
In response, it proposed a framework to guide the precision of
state duties: that the specificity of state duties depends on the

123. A.L.I., supra note 24, at 6–7.
124. Id. at 8. The makeup of the of the A.L.I.’s advisory group itself reveals
a great deal about the Eurocentrism of this period. The report’s preamble notes
the “cultures” represented include: “the Arabic, British, Canadian, Chinese,
French, pre-Nazi German, Italian, Indian, Latin American, Polish, Soviet
Russian and Spanish.”
125. Sarah A. Seo, A Shattered Dream: The American Law Institute and the
Drafting of the International Bill of Rights, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 179, 180
(2007).
126. A.L.I., supra note 24.
127. INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, PROJECT OF DECLARATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN 3 (1948).
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nature of the right affirmed.128 With regard to the right of
religion, for example, the state’s duties are presented in both
their negative form (“refrain from arbitrary limitation”) as well
as their positive, or active, form (“prevent denial of reasonable
access”).129 The statement also refers to duties of individuals in
an explanatory note: “We have likewise borne in mind that each
right involves positive and negative duties on the part of the
individual. We have emphasized this basic fact in the Preamble
and in Article 18.”130 The focus on the role of the state as a main
duty-bearer is congruent with the framing of other draft
international agreements from this period.131
C. 1948: THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF MAN
The American Declaration was both the first
intergovernmental declaration on human rights and the first
international declaration that simultaneously presented articles
on individual rights and duties.132 The text contains twentyeight articles on rights, civil and political as well as economic
and social, and ten articles on duties. The American Declaration
was first approved at the Ninth International Conference of
American States in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 1948. The
Organization of American States (“OAS”) did not yet exist at the
time of the Bogotá meeting; in fact, the OAS Charter was
finalized and signed at Bogotá alongside the American
Declaration.133
The American Declaration is also significant because of its
influence on the content of the UDHR.134 Although both
declarations were being drafted in the same period, from 1946-

128. A.L.I., supra note 24. Echoing Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s famous
“Four Freedoms” speech of 1941, the A.L.I. working group presents several
rights as “freedoms,” although the text of the articles use the term “right.” See
id.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id. at 7.
131. See also Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 6,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (affirming the declarative theory of
statehood).
132. Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No
Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 514–15 (1997).
133. Our History, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp (last
visited Oct. 28, 2016) (explaining how the OAS was formed).
134. See MORSINK, supra note 7, at 131–33; Glendon, supra note 39, at 34.
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1948, the drafting of the American Declaration started before
the process of drafting the UDHR and was ahead of it at every
point. In 1945, when representatives from the countries of Latin
America and the United States met at the Chapultepec
Conference in Mexico City to discuss the proposed post-war
economic and political order in preparation for the San Francisco
Conference to draft the UN Charter, the delegates decided to
draft an international bill of rights.135 The delegates asked the
Inter-American Juridical Committee (“IAJC”), which served as
the legal advisory body to the Pan-American Union, to prepare
a preliminary draft of the declaration.136 By 1946, before the first
meeting of the committee that was to draft the UDHR, the IAJC
had produced the “Draft Declaration of the International Rights
and Duties of Man” as well as an accompanying report.137
Here, we reach the first of our puzzles about why duties are
missing in international human rights law. The draft version of
the document provided the basis for the final declaration, but it
included a more detailed and specific articulation of state duties
than the final text that was ultimately approved at Bogotá.138
State delegates eventually removed all of these specific
discussions of state duties in the American Declaration.139 Why
did the final text of the American Declaration not include
detailed articulation of duties that were in the draft versions?
Although definitive explanations are difficult to pin down in the
archival record, there is evidence to believe that states did not
want to have such detailed discussions of state duties in order to
avoid potential future liability. Even states that supported
rights declarations preferred to leave duties provisions
conveniently vague, limiting their legal responsibility in the case
of non-compliance.140
135. Sikkink, supra note 39, at 393.
136. Id. at 394. The four-person committee consisted of experts in
international law from Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and the United States. These
committee members included Francisco Campos, Charles Fenwick, an
American professor of international law and an early advocate of a world court,
as well as F. Nieto del Rio, and Antonio Gómez Robledo, Colombian and Mexican
jurists who would continue to be active in the Inter-American human rights
system.
137. Id. at 397. See INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, DRAFT
DECLARATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN AND
ACCOMPANYING REPORT, reprinted in 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 93 (1946).
138. See INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 137, at 93, 95–
99 (1946).
139. Cf. American Declaration, supra note 34.
140. See Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr., Human Rights and
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Some of the proposals for duties in the American
Declaration did include more detailed and robust obligations of
the state. For instance, the Panamanians proposed a draft that
included detailed discussion of state duties. In the Panamanian
draft, for example, the right to property amounts to only eight
words—”Every person has the right to own property”—but the
following paragraph went into greater detail about state duties
to facilitate that right, specifying that “[t]he state has the duty
to cooperate in assisting the individual to attain a minimum
standard of private ownership of property based upon the
essential material needs of a decent life, looking to the
maintenance of the dignity of the human person and the sanctity
of human life.”141 At the Bogotá conference, the delegates of the
drafting committee were careful to omit all specific discussion of
the duties of states and also all of the articles on individual
duties. Panama argued for even more detailed state obligations,
but other states demurred, noting concerns about the differing
levels of resources and industrialization among member states.
Other reasons for deleting state duties revolved around issues of
consistency and duties as a legal term of art (in this the delegates
at Bogotá echoed some of the same concerns expressed by Pierre
Laroche a century and a half before). According to a legal expert
tasked with reconciling the drafts produced by the working
group, the “detailed and almost exhaustive” list of state duties
was excised because “on one hand, that [the state duties] would
move the text away from its mandate, and, on the other hand,
that they would detract from the power of expression and the
clarity of the Declaration.”142 Was this decision driven by desire
for clarity, or were national delegations reluctant to endorse
such specific obligations for their respective governments even
in a non-binding declaration? At the same time the delegates in
Bogotá were removing statements about state duties, they were
adding and refining articles on the duties of individuals. In some
cases, these duties of individuals complemented the primary
duties of states, but in others, the rhetoric of individual
obligation seemed to supplant that of state duty. In the end, a
hybrid model emerged, which reflected Latin America’s concern

the Organization of American States, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 319, 322–23 (1972).
141. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATORIES 101, 227, 486 (2013).
142. RICARDO JOAQUÍN ALFARO & UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES FUNDAMENTALES
DEL HOMBRE (1946).
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for sovereignty on the one hand and social economic and cultural
rights on the other hand—a political bundle known as the
“sovereignty-social rights complex.”143 The ten individual duties
in the American Declaration include duties toward children and
parents, to receive instruction, vote, obey the law, serve the
community and the nation, cooperate with the state and the
community with respect to social security and welfare, pay
taxes, work, and refrain from political activities in a foreign
country.
An exploration of diverse philosophical origins, which
informed the work of the delegates at Bogotá, may help explain
the broad support for placing individual duties in the American
Declaration. The Mexican delegate to Bogotá, Antonio Gómez
Robledo, representing a government with strict separation of
Church and State, was deeply involved in advocating for the
concept of individual duties, as was the Guatemalan delegate,
representing the leftist government of Juan José Arévalo. The
Guatemalan delegation also advocated for the inclusion of some
of the rights and duties from the Guatemalan Constitution,
written only a few years previously in 1945. The Guatemalans
justified the attention to both rights and duties, noting that
“developing countries needed to address the unique
socioeconomic challenges regarding human rights initiatives
that vastly differed from prosperous industrialized nations.”144
In this, the Guatemalan delegation alluded to concerns about the
capabilities of weak states in promoting human rights.145
The particular language pertaining to duties in the
American Declaration was crafted by a working group of several
countries, but the primary author was Mexican diplomat
Germán Fernández del Castillo. In a memorandum debriefing
the events at Bogotá, Fernández del Castillo cites the Mexican
Constitution as one of the three main sources for the duties.146

143. Greg Grandin, The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights,
Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism, 117 AM. HIST. REV. 68,
72 (2012).
144. Raymond Ruggiero, The Origins of a Democratic National Constitution:
The 1945 Guatemalan Constitution and Human Rights 56 (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) (on file with the Florida State
University Libraries).
145. See id.
146. The other two sources Fernández del Castillo mentions include The
Convention on the Status of Aliens approved at the Sixth International
Conference of American States, Havana, 1928, and the project of the
International Law Commission of the United Nations.
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Once the language came to the General Assembly at the Bogotá
meeting for debate, the Colombian Delegation proposed
including three additional individual duties. These obligations
emphasize the spiritual dimension of political obligation, and
once again allude to the effective goals of the Constitution of the
Year III and the Cádiz Constitution. These additional
obligations include: Duty to the Spirit (Deber ante el Espíritu),
Duty to Culture (Deber de Cultura), and Duty to Morals and
Morality (Deber de Moralidad y Buenas Maneras). Although
these duties were not adopted as their own articles, they did
succeed by being incorporated into the Preamble of the American
Declaration. It reads: “The fulfillment of duty by each individual
is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are
interrelated in every social and political activity of man. While
rights exalt individual liberty, duties express the dignity of that
liberty.”147 The historical records note that these measures were
“effusively adopted” by the working group on duties, as long as
it was made clear that these “moral” responsibilities were
distinct from the legal ones mentioned elsewhere in the
document.148 The American Declaration, therefore, represented
an agglomeration of duties traditions. Republican ideas about
civic virtue fused with local understandings of rights which were
already present in many of the region’s national charters.149 This
process is what one scholar has called “Inter-American
Constitutionalism,” or the interaction between human rights
developments and progressive constitutional developments in
the region.150 The idea of human rights and duties was not a
recent legal transplant in the region, but a long nourished and
cultivated local aspiration.151 These local aspirations reflected
the region’s particular understanding of the relationship
between sovereignty on the one hand, and social rights on
another, and a general culture that was quite receptive to
legalism in international relations, a mix of political and
philosophical traditions that has been aptly named the
147. American Declaration, supra note 34, pmbl.
148. See Charles G. Fenwick, The Ninth International Conference of
American States, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 563 (1948).
149. See Jorge Contesse, Inter-American Constitutionalism: The Interaction
Between Human Rights and Progressive Constitutional Law in Latin America,
in LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW MAP 220, 222 (César RodríguezGaravito ed., 2014).
150. Id.
151. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 21 (1974).
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“sovereignty-rights complex,” and which has proven deeply
influential in global understanding of human rights.152
D. 1948: THE MISSING DUTIES IN THE UDHR
None of the individual duties in the American Declaration
survived to be incorporated in the final version of the Universal
Declaration. The final draft of the UDHR mentions duties only
in a general sense as illustrated in Article 29: “Everyone has
duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.”153 But the earliest
draft of the UDHR—also called the Secretariat Draft or
Secretariat Outline, written by John Humphrey, head of the
Human Rights Division of the UN Secretariat—mentions duties
multiple times, including individual duties both to the state and
to the United Nations in the most prominent section of the
document: “Article 1: Every one owes a duty of loyalty to his
State and to the (international society) United Nations. He must
accept his just share of responsibility for the performance of such
social duties and his share of such common sacrifices as may
contribute to the common good.”154 In addition to this Article,
duties are mentioned eight more times, including state and
individual duties and vertical and horizontal duties. As it
regards individuals, the draft declaration includes duties to
“present information and news in a fair and impartial
manner,”155 and to “perform socially useful work,”156 and states
that an individual’s “right to a livelihood is conditioned by his
duty to work.”157
In drafting the Secretariat Outline, Humphrey drew on
many sources, making it difficult to pinpoint his motivations for
including duties in his draft. Still, in later memoirs, Humphrey
points to the submission of the A.L.I. (heavily contributed to and
backed by Panama’s Ricardo Alfaro) as “[t]he best of the texts
from which I worked . . . I borrowed freely from it.”158 His
152. Grandin, supra note 143, at 72.
153. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47, art. 29.
154. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Committee, Draft Outline of
International Bill of Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3, at 2, art. 1 (June 4, 1947).
155. Id. at 6, art. 18.
156. Id. at 14, art. 37.
157. Id. at 4, art. 8.
158. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A
GREAT ADVENTURE 32 (1984).
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reliance on Panama is most clear in Article 2 of the Secretariat
Draft, which functions in tandem with the social responsibility
and duties laid out in Article 1. This Article was lifted almost
verbatim from the Panamanian constitution, which states that
“[i]n the exercise of his rights every one [sic] is limited by the
rights of others and by the just requirements of the democratic
state”; the only difference is that in Article 2, the word
“democratic” is removed and the phrase “and of the United
Nations” is added to the end.159 The influence of Panama on the
Secretariat Draft suggests that the broader influence of Latin
American thought in the evolution and inclusion of the concept
of duties in international human rights agreements.
The United Kingdom, the United States, and France all
responded to the Secretariat Draft with their own versions of a
declaration of rights, including new proposed articles and
revised versions of existing articles. By exploring what was
included and excluded in these drafts, we can see the reactions
of some major powers to the duties sections of the Secretariat
Draft. The United Kingdom draft mentions duties only twice,
instead of ten times, and both times are in the preamble rather
than in the text itself.160 The first mention acknowledges that
individuals have a “duty to respect the rights of their fellow
man,” while the second is more of a limitation on the notion of
duties than an endorsement of it: “Whereas the just claims of the
state, which all men are under a duty to accept, must not
prejudice the respect of man’s right to freedom and equality
before law and the safeguard of human rights . . . .”161 It seems
that the United Kingdom government feared that the insistence
on duties might be used later to undermine the respect for rights.
The American document is not a full draft of a human rights
declaration, as are the United Kingdom and French drafts, but
rather suggestions for articles to be incorporated. Even so, the
United States draft does not mention duties, and endorses in its
first suggested article a new version of Article 3 of the
Secretariat draft that says: “In the exercise of his rights,
everyone is limited by the rights of others.”162 As opposed to the

2.

159. Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights, supra note 154, at 2, art.

160. See U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Text of Letter from Lord Dukeston, the
United Kingdom Representative on the Human Rights Commission, to the
Secretary General of the United Nations, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21, Annex B
(June 5, 1947).
161. Id.
162. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, United States Suggestions for Articles to be

222

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

rights and duties tradition in Latin America, here, we see what
we might call the rights vs. rights tradition more characteristic
of the Anglo-American thought, where individual rights are
limited only by rights or others, and are not explicitly connected
to others through an individual duty to respect their rights.
Finally, although the French version both retains and
expands upon some of the duties language of the Secretariat
draft, it also condenses multiple articles on duties. Most
interesting is the longer French version of Article 3 of the
Secretariat draft, which reads: “As human beings cannot live
and achieve their objects without the help and support of society,
each man owes to society fundamental duties which are:
obedience to law, exercise of useful activity, acceptance of the
burdens and sacrifices demanded for the common good.”163 Later
in the French version, the idea appears again that individuals
have both a “right and a duty to do work useful to society and to
develop their personalities fully.”164 In its insistence on
obedience to law, this French draft echoes some of the language
in the French Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and
Citizens of 1795. This juxtaposition of French support for duties,
and United States and United Kingdom avoidance of them
shows that the difference on duties were not between countries
of the global north and the global south, but between an AngloAmerican approach to rights that was skeptical of duties versus
the rest. In the context of the post-WWII international order,
however, the position of the United States and the United
Kingdom carried unusual weight.
At some points, the United States and United Kingdom
position received strong support from delegates from the Global
South. Charles Malik of Lebanon spoke at length about Articles
1 and 2 of the Secretariat Draft, and it is worth quoting to
illustrate a quite fierce objection to duties from one of the key
framers of the UDHR:
Speaking with respect to Articles 1 and 2, Dr. Malik
(Lebanon) questioned why they should be called
‘preliminary,’ and placed at the very beginning of the
Incorporated in an International Bill of Human Rights, at 41, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/21, Annex C (July 1, 1947).
163. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Suggestions Submitted by the
Representative of France for Articles of the International Declaration of Human
Rights, at 51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21, Annex D (July 1, 1947).
164. Id. at 61.
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Secretariat draft outline. Both of them, he said, would
limit the freedom of the individual if they were adapted
in their present form. In his opinion, any social pressure
placed upon the individual by a Bill of Rights should be
balanced by a statement of what society owes the
individual. He characterized as ‘astounding’ the
statement in the Secretariat outline: ‘Every one owes a
duty to his State’ and pointed out that it might be
questioned whether an individual owed such a duty of
loyalty regardless of the characteristics of his State. In
considering a Bill of Rights, he went on, it was odd that
men ought first be told that their freedom is limited. If
this were done it would be a Bill not of Human Rights
but of what man owes society. It was precisely because
the balance had been tipped against the individual and
in favor of society that human rights had been violated.
He concluded by saying that Article 1 of the Secretariat
draft was to him objectionable and should not be
included; or if included should be reworded; and that
Article 2 should not appear at the beginning of the Bill of
Rights.165
A representative from the United Kingdom supported
Malik’s point of view, stating that he thought that the article on
duties “should be omitted from the Bill but that the substantive
idea might be included somewhere in the preamble.”166 Similar
opposition to these articles came from the representatives from
the Philippines and from China, who suggested that in dealing
with a declaration on human rights, “the rights of the individual
should be stressed before his duties to society.”167 The main
delegate from the United States, and the chair of the UDHR
drafting committee, Eleanor Roosevelt, agreed that “the article
regarding the general limitations on the enjoyment of rights
would be better placed towards the end of the Declaration.”168
Following these initial complaints, delegates continued to cut
back on duties until they almost disappeared from the
Secretariat Draft.

165. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Summary Record of the Third Meeting, at
9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.3 (June 13, 1947).
166. Id. at 10.
167. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Summary Record of the Seventy-Seventh
Meeting, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.77 (June 28, 1948).
168. Id.
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When the drafting process opened up to all member states
of the United Nations in the later months of 1948, the Latin
American delegates worked to reinsert references to duties into
the UDHR. The Cuban delegate Pérez Cisneros pushed this
firmly. Cisneros explained, “the individual should also be
reminded that he was a member of society and that he must
affirm his right to be a human being by clearly recognizing the
duties which were corollaries of his rights.”169 The Brazilian
delegate similarly argued that it was “impossible to draw up a
declaration of rights without proclaiming the duties implicit in
the concept of freedom . . . .”170 Without the concept of duties, he
said, “freedom might lead to anarchy and tyranny.”171 Here,
Brazil and Cuba spoke for the majority of Latin American states
that had worked to get individual duties into the American
Declaration.
The Latin American delegates failed to obtain a detailed list
of duties in the Universal Declaration; they had to settle for the
single line in Article 29 mentioning duties. Nevertheless, in the
wording of that line, some believed they secured a victory for a
more communitarian vision. The line reads: “Everyone has
duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.”172 The victory came
with the word “alone,” which in their mind recognized that
community was necessary to the enjoyment of rights and that
duties were essential to the protection of that community.173 The
exact reasons for the rejection of duties language by other
delegates are not completely clear. In his memoirs, when
discussing this final period of drafting the UDHR, John
Humphrey mentioned the “Bogotá menace,” his term for the
efforts of Latin American delegates to try to get the entire
content of the American Declaration into the UDHR.174 Since we
know that Humphrey included duties in his Secretariat Draft,
we can conclude that his “Bogotá menace” was not the inclusion
of duties per se, but the delay that would be caused to the
consideration of the UDHR if Latin Americans insisted on
debating each of the ten articles on duties in the America
Declaration as they had appeared in the regional declaration.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

MORSINK, supra note 7, at 247.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 246.
See id. at 247–49.
See id. at 131.
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Such a debate may have been perceived as threatening to the
timely completion of the UDHR.
The failure to include any detailed discussion of duties in
the UDHR created a path-dependent situation where virtually
all subsequent human rights treaties also failed to mention
specific duties beyond a general statement in a single article.175
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) as well as the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) do not contain references
to specific individual duties in the body of the treaty, although
they include a statement on duties in their preambles:
“Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals
and to the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”176 In these later
binding human rights agreements, duties were implied, but not
explicitly stated. As a result, over the next several decades the
idea that an explicit and robust set of duties should naturally
accompany rights all but disappeared from the content of
international human rights law. The continuous failure to
include references to specific duties in later international human
rights documents, however, meant that rights came to be
understood as attributes of the individual rather than as
constitutive of a relationship between a rights-holder and a
duty-holder.177
Particularly puzzling is the absence of duties in the
American Convention of Human Rights of 1969. The initial draft
of the American Convention prepared by the Inter-American
Council of Jurists did not contain any mention of the individual
duties that figure so prominently in the American Declaration,
nor did delegates add duties during the drafting process.178 This
175. On “path dependence,” see generally Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel
Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POL. 341 (2007); Orfeo
Fioretos, Historical Institutionalism in International Relations, 65 INT’L ORG.
367 (2011) (explaining the impact of path dependence in political development).
176. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
177. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 154.
178. INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS; DRAFT
RESOLUTION APPROVED BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND REVISED BY THE STYLE
COMMITTEE (1959). The draft resolution was produced in 1959 by the Council
of Jurists, however, it was not finalized by states until the Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San Jose, California on November

226

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

demonstrates the path-dependent nature of the drafting of
human rights treaties. After duties language was explicitly
excluded from the UDHR, it was not reinserted in any human
rights treaty, with the single exception of the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights.179
E. DUTIES AND THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
The only major exception to this abrupt turn to exclude
duties in human rights treaties was the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was drafted in 1979 and
entered into force in 1986.180 The African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter) has received
attention for including both individual rights and collective
(Peoples’) rights in the document, especially the right to selfdetermination.181 Less attention has been directed toward the
innovative way it addresses duties and the fact that it is the only
human rights treaty to do so with any degree of specificity.182
The preamble to the African Charter recognizes “that the
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance
of duties on the part of everyone,”183 and Articles 27–29 of the
Charter contain specific duties of individuals.184 Part I of the
Charter is labeled “Rights and Duties”; Chapter 1 handles rights
while Chapter 2 handles individual duties.185 In the discussion
of rights, the Charter makes various references to the duties of
States to promote rights.186 Chapter 2, Article 27, paragraph 1
of the Charter states that, “[e]very individual shall have duties
towards his family and society, the State and other legally
recognized communities and the international community.”187
This language echoes the Secretariat Draft’s discussion of
22, 1969. Although the draft was opened for signatures, not enough ratifications
were secured until 1978, when the draft ultimately went into effect.
179. See African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note
34.
180. Id. at 1.
181. See id. art. 20.
182. For an exception, see Paust, supra note 6, at 56.
183. African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 34,
at 2.
184. Id. at 8–9.
185. Id. at 2, 8.
186. See, e.g., id. at 8.
187. Id. at 8.
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international duties, but is the first time a human rights treaty
includes duties that extend to the international community.
In a region often characterized as more communitarian, it is
interesting to see this cosmopolitan understanding of duties.
Article 28 of the Banjul Charter then proclaims the duty to
respect others, and “to maintain relations aimed at promoting,
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.”188
Finally, Article 29 lists nine specific individual duties, including
the duty to the family and to parents in particular, the duty to
serve the national community and national independence, the
duty to work and pay taxes, and the duty to preserve African
cultural values and to promote African unity.189 In the duties to
promote African unity, we see the lingering effect of the PanAfrican movement as duties expand to include the regional
community.190 Yet, when the African Charter turns in Part II to
“measures of safeguard,” the main institution to enforce the
Charter, the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, is only given the task of promoting and ensuring the
protection of rights, with no mention of the possibility of
promoting duties.191 This suggests that once again, the belief
that it is more difficult or problematic to enforce duties may have
complicated the inclusion of duties in human rights documents.
Around the same time as the African Charter was being
drafted, the United Nations commissioned a survey in 1976 to
study the status of duties of the individual to the community
under international law.192 To research the question, the Special
Rapporteur asked Member States to respond to a survey to
articulate their nations’ stances toward the individual’s duties
to the community, both in international law and under their
domestic constitutions.193 The comments by both the East
German government and the West German government gave an
idea of what was at stake during the Cold War in the debate
about rights and duties and reveals just how contentious the
188. Id.
189. See id. at 8–9.
190. On the influence of Pan-Africanism, see generally Brooke Coe, Regional
Identities and Dynamic Normative Orders in the Global South: A Comparative
Study (Sept. 2015) (unpublished Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University
of Minnesota) (on file with author) (comparing the evolution of sovereignty in
the global south).
191. See African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note
34, at 9–12.
192. DAES, supra note 62, at 53.
193. See id. at 21–31.
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issue was. The East German government (German Democratic
Republic) wrote: “The concept of citizen’s basic rights in the
German Democratic Republic and the way in which those rights
are put into effect are determined by the desire of the socialist
State and socialist order to give individuals full scope to develop
into socialist personalities, it being understood in this context
that citizens’ basic rights are inseparably linked with their basic
duties to the community.”194 The West German government, in
contrast, expressed concern that such an understanding of rights
and duties would undermine respect for human rights at a
fundamental level:
The state and the community, with their inherent
monopoly of power, can protect themselves against
dereliction of duty and abuses of law by individual
citizens. For this reason, the rights of the community visà-vis the individual and the individual’s duties
corresponding to these rights do not need to be protected
and given institutionalized safeguards in the same way
as human rights.195
In the context of the Cold War, with the shadow of fascism
in the not-too-distant past, countries like West Germany feared
that naming individual duties to the community would permit
states to use an individual’s failure to perform duties as a
justification for denying rights. These fears were not unfounded.
In fact, in the same UN report, the Soviet Union plainly referred
to duties as a “precondition” for the enjoyment of human
rights.196
Perhaps for this reason, initiatives to codify responsibilities
were delayed until the post-Cold War era. In 1997, a year before
the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, an organization of elite statesmen from around the world
called the InterAction Council proposed a new international
agreement: The Draft Declaration of Human Responsibilities.197
Designed both to commemorate and to complement the UDHR,
the draft document called for a shared “global ethic” that
balances the rights of individuals with basic human

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
Id. at 30.
See InterAction Council, supra note 11, at 195.
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responsibilities.198 While many of the document’s signers were
leaders from Europe and North America, by no means did they
constitute a homogeneous clique. Some members, such as Jimmy
Carter and Oscar Arias Sánchez, were Nobel Peace Prize
winners and pillars of the international human rights
movement. Others, like Michael Gorbachev, Helmut Schmidt,
and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, stood at the helm of traditional
European powers. The list also included leaders from smaller
states, such as Lee Kuan Yew, the former premier of Singapore
who famously prioritized efficient governance, economic growth,
and a concern for “Asian Values” above universal human
rights.199 Even Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara, two of
the Cold War’s most prominent realists, signed on as supporters
of the initiative, along with an array of other leaders
representing academia, international organizations, and NGOs.
Despite diversity in backgrounds and ideologies, the backers of
the declaration agreed on an unambiguous, if ambitious,
premise: “[All] people, to the best of their knowledge and ability,
have a responsibility to foster a better social order, both at home
and globally.”200 Noting that an over-emphasis on rights could
lead to “conflict, division and endless dispute”201 the draft
declaration called for all people to acknowledge the need for
responsibilities, and then outlined specific obligations.
The proposed Declaration of Human Responsibilities failed
to make an impact. Rather than complementing the UDHR as
envisioned, the document unleashed a barrage of criticism from
almost every conceivable sector. Legal scholars argued that
individuals already possessed obligations, which, though
implied, were firmly established by international law, making
the declaration superfluous and vague at best.202 Feminist
scholars saw patriarchal motivations behind the call to balance
rights and responsibilities, particularly in its insistence on
family and domestic responsibilities.203 Amnesty International
alleged that the declaration would “muddy” the understanding
of universal human rights, and raised the possibility that the
document could provide cover to authoritarian regimes in
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
See Sen, supra note 29, at 33–34.
See sources cited supra note 11.
See sources cited supra note 11.
See Saul, supra note 19, at 572.
SIOBHÁN MULLALLY, GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
RECLAIMING UNIVERSALISM 8 (Colin Harvey ed., 2006).
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denying their citizens basic rights.204 Perhaps critics even saw
the document as emblematic of a nascent and problematic
“responsibilities movement” in international human rights
law.205 In response to these calls for greater emphasis on
obligations, the United Nations General Assembly passed the
“Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.”206 This document, however, does not pick up the
standard of individual responsibility in human rights law.
Instead, the General Assembly’s resolution reinforces the
traditional view that the duty to respect or to promote human
rights lies solely with states.207 The “human responsibilities
movement” proved to be less of a threat to the traditional human
rights regime than scholars and activists feared at the time.
IV.

DATA ON INDIVIDUAL DUTIES IN NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS

As noted earlier, duties talk has largely been supplanted by
references to responsibilities with human rights. The chart
below, taken from Google’s N-Gram database, illustrates the
simultaneous proliferation of rights talk, the long slow decline of
duties language, and the relatively recent but steady growth of
responsibilities:

204. See Amnesty Int’l & Int’l Secretariat, supra note 16, at 5; see also
McGregor, supra note 16, at 21 (noting the resistance to the draft declaration
was based on fear that it would undermine existing universal rights).
205. Saul, supra note 19, at 574.
206. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144
(Dec. 9, 1988).
207. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, annex, at 3 (March 8,
1999).
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N-Gram for Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities
1800-2008.208

208. Google
Ngram
Viewer,
GOOGLE,
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=rights%2Cduties%2Cresponsi
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Despite these historical trends, and the failure of duties to
be explicitly incorporated into the UDHR, the rights and duties
concept did not die out: it found its expression in national
constitutions rather than in international treaties. The seeming
contradiction, a dearth of responsibilities language in
international human rights treaties alongside a wealth of
responsibilities in global constitutions, is illustrative of the
distinct traditions that make up the global discourse on human
rights. Using data from the CCP,209 we analyzed the frequency
and content of individual duties and found that the rights and
duties concept has been resilient over time and across regions.210
Duties of individuals have become a standard part of
constitutional repertoire, particularly in nations outside the
American and British common law tradition. By examining
duties in national constitutions systematically, we aimed to
assess the frequency and geographic concentration of individual
duties in national constitutions as well as the diffusion of the
duties over time and space.211 Constitutions vary considerably in
structure, style, and specificity. A single duty can be referred to
using different language, even though it conveys the same basic
obligation for individuals. Therefore, working inductively, we
grouped the particular articles found in global constitutions by
topic, creating 27 separate individual duty categories (duty to
vote, duty to defend the nation, etc.). Coding duties provisions
was not always straightforward. As noted earlier, obligations
may not be stated explicitly to be legally binding, or, they may
be expressed in synonymous terms (“citizens must” versus
“citizens have the duty”). For consistency, our study only counts
explicit mentions of “duty” or “obligation” of citizens that
appears within an article of a written constitution.212
bilities&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=
&direct_url=t1%3B%2Crights%3B%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2Cduties%3B%2Cc0%3
B.t1%3B%2Cresponsibilities%3B%2Cc0 (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
209. The database of all constitutions of independent states since 1789. For
more information on the database design and methodology, see About the CCP,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativeconstitutions
project.org/about-ccp/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). See COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra note 48.
210. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth A. Simmons, Getting to
Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights
Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61, 72 (2013).
211. Only individual duties were included in the analysis. Duties of the
state, community or other entities were excluded.
212. While we employ the term “responsibility” in our discussion, the coding
process did not include this term. As noted above, “responsibility” has a broader
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After conducting this analysis, we find that duties are a
truly global phenomenon; almost two-thirds of all independent
states (62%) feature at least one duty of individual citizens. As
one would expect, vertical duties that individuals owe to the
state, such as the duty to pay taxes or perform military service,
are among the most common duties (see chart below). But other
duties, horizontal duties to protect the environment (33% of
constitutions), work (20%), and care for and educate children
(27%) also rank among the most common of all duties.
We have derived two clear findings from the descriptive data
on duties in constitutions. The first is that duties are especially
common in Latin American nations. They have, on average, 5.95
duties per constitution, whereas non-Latin American countries
have on average 3.9 duties in their constitutions. The second
finding is that there is a strong difference between the former
colonies of the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. The
United Kingdom itself does not have a written constitution, but
no former British colony (including the United States) features
a duty of the individual in its constitution. We do not yet know
whether this is a result of common law legal systems or is due to
some other feature of the British tradition.
Recent scholarship on the diffusion of human rights norms
has established a clear link between the provisions in
international agreements and those in national constitutions.
Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Beth Simmons found that
the drafters of national constitutions borrow from the repertoire
of human rights provisions established by international
agreements, and that once established, these rights provisions
tend to be durable over time—once a provision is included in the
“menu of rights”, it tends not to disappear.213 But unlike what
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Simmons find in the case of human rights
provisions, the prevalence of duties in constitutions has not
diffused downward from international human rights
instruments.214 Nor have duties diffused in the other direction—
set of meanings, only some of which were synonymous with the idea of
individual obligation we refer to in this Article. On the other hand, “duties” and
“responsibilities” are used more or less interchangeably in the constitutional
provisions studied. The exclusion of “responsibility” and related terms such as
“must” and “are required to” likely undercounts the frequency of explicit citizen
obligations within our sample.
213. Elkins, Ginsburg & Simmons, supra note 210, at 72.
214. Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and
Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 202–03 (2008).
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from constitutions into international human rights law—
because, with the exception of the American Declaration and the
African Charter, international human rights instruments have
not included any detailed enumeration of individual duties. It
does appear likely that language in constitutions has diffused
horizontally from one constitution to another; in the case of
duties to the environment, for example, a number of
constitutions have quite similar language, suggesting that they
borrowed phrasing from other constitutions, and from
international declarations such as the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm
Declaration).215 It is not our purpose here to provide an account
of what factors lead to the adoption of individual duties in
constitutions. Rather, we have used this data to map the overall
spread of the idea of individual duties to help refine our typology
and theoretical understanding of individual responsibilities in
human rights thinking.

215. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (June 16, 1972).

2017]

(RE)DISCOVERING DUTIES

235

Analyzing the CCP Data:
Number of Constitutions Containing the Most
Common Individual Duties
Duty Provision
Defend sovereignty

Number of Constitutions
83

Obey the laws

66

Protect environment and natural resources

64

Pay taxes
Educate and raise children
Serve the nation (military or civilian service)
Work
Respect the rights of others
Protect national heritage and culture
Protect property
Receive education
Assist parents and the elderly
Work toward the common good
Promote national unity
Respect national symbols and values
Vote
Other
Cooperate with authorities to uphold laws
Fulfill professional obligations
Owe allegiance to the nation
Participate in public life
Promote health
Protect peace, democracy, and social justice
Protect the rights of children and family
Recognize duties and responsibilities
Promote education
Promote human rights

53
52
45
39
38
26
26
21
21
20
19
18
17
16
16
15
15
12
12
11
9
9
5
3
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V. FROM DUTY TO RESPONSIBILITY: DUTIES AND
THE RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT

What is at stake when we debate duties? For some human
rights advocates, any kind of talk about individual duties raises
the specter of repressive statism and limitations on individual
liberty. These fears have existed from the founding moments of
the contemporary human rights system, as when Malik, the
Lebanese delegate to the UDHR Drafting Committee,
questioned the idea of duties to the state because the greatest
threat to individual rights was often the state itself.
Even contemporary thinkers, who are sympathetic to
cosmopolitan ethics in general, express skepticism about
individualized obligations to promote human rights.216 In the
context of the 21st century, however, where attention has tipped
decidedly in favor of rights, we may be able to rediscover an older
understanding of individual human duties as explicitly
complementary to human rights to address pressing global
problems. In doing so, we recognize that the linking of rights and
duties is a deeply-rooted principle in the history of human rights.
Among the traditions we discuss here, rights and duties are not
two separate concepts, but rather a single interconnected
concept that may be thought of as a rights and duties concept.
Importantly, the concept of coupling rights and duties
displays the agency of norm entrepreneurs from the Global
South, illustrating how universal concepts of rights can exist in
harmony with local political traditions and philosophies. These
Southern norm entrepreneurs, especially those from Latin
America in the late 1940s, revived the rights and duties model.
Some suggest that it was Catholic social doctrine that led to the
emphasis on duties in the Americas, borrowing from encyclicals
such as the Rerum Novarum—the foundational document of
contemporary social justice in the Catholic Church.217 We argue
that attention to duties comes from a more diverse set of
philosophical traditions in the region, and therefore, represents
a kind of compromise between those who only wish to emphasize
the rights of individuals against society and those who view
society as an organic whole. In this way, duties of individuals
216. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022 (2007)
(discussing the renewal of interest in cosmopolitan duties under international
law).
217. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Influence of Catholic Social Doctrine on
Human Rights, 10 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 69, 70 (2013).
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offer an example of a kind of hybrid model of international
human rights that emerged when actors on the semi-periphery
of the world system appropriated and redeployed legal and
theoretical concepts of the Global North.218
Scholars of international law often argue that universal
human rights ideas are imposed on the international community
by powerful states seeking to create institutions favorable to
their interests.219 Other scholars have critiqued the tainted
origins of human rights in Western, liberal, and secular thought
by arguing that Universalist rhetoric of human rights can crowd
out other local strategies or vocabularies that promote human
dignity.220 Still others have proposed that human rights
represent the latest version of the European mission
civilisatrice, a secular religion serving the needs of Western
governments by taking advantage of vulnerable people.221
Historians have similarly critiqued commonly accepted
narratives of the development of human rights. Notably, Sam
Moyn has argued that origins of human rights ideals are less
universal and more recent than most historians of the subject
would like to admit.222 Taken together, these critiques have
highlighted the contingent, contested, and socially-constructed
nature of the rights themselves. Yet, our investigation into
duties suggests that critiques of rights may, ironically, overlook
the intellectual contributions of actors from the Global South,
which sought to balance individualism and collectivism.
The discussion of the position of duties in the American
Declaration helps illustrate how, even when assimilating and
articulating Enlightenment ideals about universal rights and
duties, Latin American states and their representatives offer
alternate interpretations of those concepts; ones that offer
possibilities for strengthening the moral legitimacy of
international human rights.223 Southern protagonism arguably
increases the legitimacy of global governance projects, including
the human rights and duties project. Amitav Acharya, for
218. See Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: NineteenthCentury Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 503
(2010).
219. See EVANS, supra note 2, at 8.
220. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 114.
221. See generally HOPGOOD, supra note 58 (arguing that universal human
rights are not well-adapted to today’s social environment).
222. See e.g., MOYN, supra note 58.
223. See Louise Fawcett, Between West and non-West: Latin American
Contributions to International Thought, 34 INT’L HIST. REV. 679 (2012).
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example, critiques the study of normative change because it
ignores the appeal of local and regional norms and because it
fails to recognize the agency of local and regional actors. Acharya
then developed the concept of norm ‘localization;’ a process
through which local actors actively reconstruct global norms to
create a fit between those norms and prior local norms.224
Acharya’s concept of norm localization is related to the concept
of norm “vernacularization,” which was proposed by
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry. Merry points to social
movements as human rights intermediaries that help
vernacularize international human rights discourses,225
meaning that they negotiate between “the language of
international human rights preferred by international
donors . . . and cultural terms that will be acceptable to at least
some of the local community.”226
This linking of individual rights and duties by norm
entrepreneurs in the Global South has been largely overlooked,
or mentioned only as an artifact of regional thinking. Revisiting
the history of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights
offers historical insights into the development of thinking about
human rights and duties in the mid-twentieth century. Both of
these cases suggest that the topic of individual rights and duties
can provide insight into the way norms can be shaped, shared,
and adapted by States on the periphery or semi-periphery of the
international legal system.
A brief examination of the duty to protect the environment
reveals an illustrative example of norm localization at work. The
Comparative Constitutions data reveals that the Right to
Environment is both one of the most common and more recent
individual duties in world constitutions. Many constitutions
written since 1990 are likely to include a duty to protect the
environment. Countries from every region of the world include
the duty to protect or preserve the environment, including
twenty from African countries, thirteen from European
countries, eight from Asian countries, and three from Middle
224. See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm
Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239,
241 (2004); see also Amitav Acharya, Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders:
Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World, 55 INT’L STUD.
Q. 95, 97 (2011).
225. See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local
Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N. 38, 39 (2006).
226. Id. at 42.
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Eastern countries. We see that this duty is not associated with
any particular religion, as many countries from a wide range of
religious traditions are represented among those with
constitutions that include the duty to protect or preserve the
environment. The table below presents a range of different ways
that the duty to the environment is phrased in a selection of
different constitutions from around the world. We see that the
right to live in a healthy environment is often mentioned in the
same article, and even in the same sentence with the duty to
defend and protect it.

Selected language from constitutions with a right
to a healthy environment:
Country and
Year of
Constitution
Angola (2010)

Bhutan
(2008)

Bolivia (2009)

Phrasing

“Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and
unpolluted environment and the duty to defend
and preserve it.”227
“Every Bhutanese is a trustee of the Kingdom’s
natural resources and environment for the
benefit of the present and future generations
and it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to
contribute to the protection of the natural
environment, conservation of the rich
biodiversity of Bhutan and prevention of all
forms of ecological degradation including noise,
visual and physical pollution through the
adoption and support of environment friendly
practices and policies.”228
“The duties of Bolivians are . . . to protect and
defend the natural resources, and to contribute
to their sustainable use in order to preserve the
rights of future generations . . . .to protect and
defend an environment suitable for the
development of living beings.”229

227. ANGOLA [CONSTITUTION] 2010, art. 39.
228. BHUTAN [CONSTITUTION] 2008, art. 5.
229. BOLIVIA [CONSTITUTION] 2009, art. 108.
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Brazil (1988)

Burkina Faso
(1991)

Cape Verde
(1980)
Colombia
(1991)

Côte d’Ivoire
(2000)

Cuba (1976)

Egypt (2014)

Estonia
(1992)

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

“Everyone has the right to an ecologically
balanced environment, which is a public good for
the people’s use and is essential for a healthy
life. The Government and the community have a
duty to defend and to preserve the environment
for present and future generations.”230
“The right to a healthy environment is
recognized; the protection, the defense and the
promotion of the environment are a duty for
all.”231
“Everyone shall have the right to a healthy,
ecologically balanced environment, and the duty
to defend and conserve it.”232
“The following are duties of the individual and of
the citizen . . . to protect the country’s cultural
and natural resources and to keep watch that a
healthy environment is being preserved.”233
“The protection of the environment and the
promotion of the quality of life are a duty for the
community and for each physical or moral
person.”234
“It is the duty of the citizens to contribute to the
protection of the water and the atmosphere, and
to the conservation of the soil, flora, fauna, and
all the rich potential of nature.”235
“Every individual has the right to live in a
healthy, sound and balanced environment. Its
protection is a national duty.”236
“Everyone has a duty to preserve the human and
natural environment and to compensate for
damage caused to the environment by him or
her.”237

CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] 2009 art. 225 (Braz.).
BURKINA FASO [CONSTITUTION] 1991, rev. 2012, art. 29.
CAPE VERDE [CONSTITUTION] 1980, rev. 1992, art. 70.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] 1991 art. 3.
CÔTE D’IVOIRE [CONSTITUTION] 2000, art. 28.
CUBA [CONSTITUTION] 1976, rev. 2002, art. 27.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 46.
ESTONIA [CONSTITUTION] 1992, rev. 2011, art. 53.
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“The exercise and enjoyment of rights and
freedoms are inseparable from the performance
of duties and obligations, and accordingly, every
citizen shall . . . protect and conserve the
environment of The Gambia.”238
“Natural resources, in particular arable land,
forests and the reserves of water, biodiversity, in
particular native plant and animal species, as
well as cultural assets shall form the common
heritage of the nation; it shall be the obligation
of the State and everyone to protect and
maintain them, and to preserve them for future
generations.”239
“The State, and all the inhabitants of the
national territory, have the obligation of
promoting economic and social development that
prevents
environmental
contamination,
maintains ecological balance, and avoids the
destruction of ecosystems.”240
“Everyone shall care for the quality of the
environment and shall be held responsible for
causing its degradation.”241
“All people in the Federal Republic of Somalia
have a duty to safeguard and enhance the
environment
and
participate
in
the
development,
execution,
management,
conservation and protection of the natural
resources and environment.”242
“The exercise and enjoyment of rights and
freedoms are inseparable from the performance
of duties and obligations and accordingly it is the
duty of every person in Sri Lanka . . . to protect
nature and conserve its riches.”243

238. GAMBIA [CONSTITUTION] 1996, rev. 2004, art. 220.
239. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL
HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY. art. P.
240. PANAMA [CONSTITUTION] 1972, rev. 2004, art. 119.
241. POLAND [CONSTITUTION] 1997, rev. 2009, art. 86.
242. SOMALIA [CONSTITUTION] 2012, art. 45.
243. SRI LANKA [CONSTITUTION] 1978, rev. 2015, art. 28.
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Timor-Leste
(2002)

Turkey (1982)

Ukraine
(1996)
Vanuatu
(1980)

Venezuela
(1999)

Yemen (1991)

“All have the right to a humane, healthy, and
ecologically balanced environment and the duty
to protect it and improve it for the benefit of the
future generations.”244
“It is the duty of the State and citizens to
improve the natural environment, to protect the
environmental
health
and
to
prevent
environmental pollution.”245
“Everyone is obliged not to harm nature,
cultural heritage and to compensate for any
damage he or she inflicted.”246
“Every person has the following fundamental
duties to himself and his descendants and to
others . . . to safeguard the national wealth,
resources and environment in the interests of
the present generation and of future
generations.”247
“It is the right and duty of each generation to
protect and maintain the environment for its
own benefit and that of the world of the
future.”248
“Each individual shall have a religious and
national duty to protect the environment.”249

We argue that combined attention to rights and duties of
individuals has a long pedigree that includes important
contributions of Latin American and African diplomats and legal
scholars. We also establish that individual duties, although
infrequent in international human rights law, are very
prominent in national constitutions and are often interspersed
with rights-related language. One reason that duties are not
well established in human rights law or discourse is because
diplomats, scholars, and activists cogently critique individual
duties on normative and political grounds.

244. TIMOR-LESTE [CONSTITUTION] 2002, art. 61.
245. TURKEY [CONSTITUTION] 1982, rev. 2011, art. 56.
246. UKRAINE [CONSTITUTION] 1996, rev. 2014, art. 66.
247. VANUATU [CONSTITUTION] 1980, rev. 1983, art. 7.
248. BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION] 1999, rev. 2009,
art. 127.
249. YEMEN [CONSTITUTION] 1991, rev. 2001, art. 35.
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Today, there is a resurgence of the talk of duties and
responsibilities, but most discussion focuses on the duties of
international institutions.250 Seen in this way, the primary
challenge is to reform our global institutions, whether they be
the World Trade Organization or the United Nations Security
Council. Legal experts who propose to build a more diverse dutybearer regime tend to be most concerned about expanding dutybearers to include international organizations, transnational
corporations, and non-state actors such as insurgent groups,
rather than stressing the duties of individuals.251 We support
these efforts, but believe that this more diverse regime should
include individual obligations. Attention to individual
responsibilities need not detract from the significant project of
ensuring that global institutions collectively promote the basic
human rights of the poor and the socially marginal.
The situation in the first part of the 21st century is quite
different from that of 1948. Today, there is a dense body of
international human rights law that spells out a wide range of
rights and puts in place a growing set of institutions designed to
implement, and occasionally enforce, such rights. This does not
mean that rights are being fully or universally enjoyed—far from
it. Still, it suggests that in the task of promoting rights, it may
be useful to move beyond the obvious and important duties of the
state and the newer and important responsibilities of
international organizations and corporations to reconsider the
horizontal duties of individuals to other individuals and to
society, including international society.252 Such duties can be
important ways to supplement or complement state duties and
enhance the respect for rights.
In particular, we wish to draw attention to the duties that
individuals have to protect the environment and to respect and
promote the rights of other individuals. There are many duties
listed in constitutions, but the most important in our minds are
the ones that stress the duties of individuals to protect the
environment and to respect the rights of others. As such, we
argue that more attention to these kinds of duties may help

250. See Pogge, supra note 36, at 64.
251. See also Steven Ratner Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); see generally van Genugten,
supra note 49 (exploring the human rights legal regime with respect to different
duty-bearers in changing times).
252. On responsibilities of corporations for human rights practices, see
Ratner, supra, note 251.
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enhance human rights rather than subvert them. Stressing
duties as useful complements to human rights could be an
essential tool to address global public policy challenges,
especially on issues related to global climate change where
emphasizing rights is unlikely to help advance the issue unless
an entire network of duty-holders is also mobilized.
We argue that part of the dismissal of duties stems from the
way they are framed or located in political thought. Because
many
associate
duties
with
conservatism,
religion,
authoritarianism, and communitarianism, they may feel that
attention to duties will necessarily imperil rights. There are good
reasons to be skeptical when states, such as Russia with its
troubled records of compliance, present resolutions in the
Human Rights Council about “traditional values of humankind”
as a vehicle for promoting human rights. Moreover, there is
concern when Islamic states say that the right to free speech
should be limited by a duty not to blaspheme. However, we
believe it is possible, and even necessary, to come from a strong
human rights perspective and speak about the importance of
individual duties—especially those duties that involve
protecting the environment and respecting or promoting the
rights of others. In doing so, we hope to echo ideas described by
Martha Nussbaum and others as the capabilities approach,
which stress the full flourishing of the human person in harmony
with her environment.253 Again, this view requires stressing the
relational quality of human rights while concurrently stressing
the inherent dignity of the individual.
We do not argue that new human rights treaties should be
written that incorporate explicit articles about individual duties.
Instead, we recognize that rights are always relational and thus
rights and duties always coexist. Nevertheless, within this
existing framework of human rights law, much more can be done
to highlight not just our individual rights, but also our individual
duties to protect rights. We call for a more in-depth awareness
and application of the words in the common preamble to both the
ICCPR and the ICESCR: “Realizing that the individual, having
duties to other individuals and to the community to which he

253. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social
Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992)
(examining the realm of essentialism in the context of moral and non-moral
human functioning).
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belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”254
Much more can be done to highlight that protecting rights
is a long-term project involving partnerships between states,
international institutions, civil society, and individuals. In these
partnerships, all sides have complementary duties and
responsibilities to promote rights. Duties and rights do not need
to come into conflict with one another, but can mutually
reinforce one another. Our proposal is not to rewrite the law, but
to rediscover the history of rights and duties, and thus use it to
build new constituencies for combined attention to rights and
duties with the goal of addressing the world’s most pressing
needs.

254. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 176, pmbl. (1966).

